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The Fine Art of Copyright Protection:
A Suggestion for Change in the
Application of the Fair Use Doctrine
By JOSHUA W. ANDREWS*
The [artist's] copy [of life] is the personal reaction of an individual
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It ex-
presses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade
of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words
of the act.1
ART HAS BEEN defined as "a method or device that produces an
artistic effect or is used for decorative purposes."2 Fine art has further
been defined as "art that is concerned primarily with the creation of
beautiful objects . . . [and] art for which aesthetic purposes are pri-
mary or uppermost."3 Individual imaginations provide the inspiration
for the creation of works in a variety of mediums, from painting to
sculpture to photography. It seems an affront to the spirit of the art-
ist-and to the effort put into each creation-to allow a copyrighted
work to be used by another without permission for the primary pur-
pose of financial gain. Under limitations of copyright laws such as the
fair use doctrine,4 this is exactly what can happen. Artists who create
* Class of 2002. The author would like to dedicate this Comment to his family and
thank them for their enduring and unconditional support throughout law school. The
author extends special thanks to Barbara Lemmick for showing him, through the art of
photography, a different way to appreciate the world.
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (emphasis
added).
2. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 122
(3d ed. 1993).
3. Id. at 852.
4. The fair use doctrine has been defined as:
A privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted mate-
rial in a reasonable manner without the owner's consent, notwithstanding the
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original works, quite possibly for their own enjoyment or with quite
specific audiences in mind, can lose the right to control where and
how their works are displayed.
As detailed below, 5 the fair use doctrine allows an alleged copy-
right infringer to legally use a copyrighted work, such as a painting or
a photograph, unhindered by the exclusive rights granted to a copy-
right holder under federal protection. 6 Under specific circumstances,
this doctrine allows use of an artist's creation in ways contrary to some
of copyright's fundamental principles. This Comment addresses two
instances in which works of fine art deserving copyright protection
were used in major motion pictures without the consent of the artist,
and the use was justified under this supposedly equitable doctrine.
In order to frame these issues in context with the basic purposes
of copyright, Part I discusses the general background and origins of
copyright protection. Part II addresses the subject matter of copyright,
the types of work that are protected, and the requirements for copy-
right eligibility. Part III analyzes the fair use doctrine and its history,
and focuses on how the doctrine limits copyright protection to cre-
ators in specific situations. In addition, Part III discusses two relevant
cases where the fair use doctrine has been used to strip fine art copy-
right owners of some of their exclusive rights to their creative works.
Part IV analyzes the problem of applying the fair use doctrine to works
of fine art, such that the rights of artists become subordinate to com-
mercial enterprises. Finally, Part V offers a potential solution that pro-
vides more adequate protection for fine art copyright owners.
I. The Origin of Copyright Law
British censorship laws of the sixteenth century formed the foun-
dation for United States copyright law.7 Early British statutes and laws
recognized the rights of authors over their manuscripts based on prin-
ciples of "natural justice," their ownership stemming from the premise
that authors were entitled to enjoy the fruits of their labor.8 As tech-
nology improved with the invention of moveable type and the poten-
monopoly granted to the owner .... Fair use involves a balancing process by
which a complex of variables determines whether other interests should override
the rights of the creators.
BLACK'S LAw DicIONARY 598 (6th ed. 1990). See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
5. See discussion infra Part Ill.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
7. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAw 1 (1991).
8. See ROBERT E. LEE. A COPYRIGHT GUIDE FOR AUTHORS 14 (1995).
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tial for copying increased, appropriate legislation was implemented. 9
The leading publishers in London, known collectively during this era
as the Stationer's Company, were granted by the Crown a monopoly
over book publication in 1556.10 With this monopoly, the publication
of seditious and heretical works could be controlled more effec-
tively.11 Protection and compensation of authors were not the Crown's
initial intent.12 Rather, publishers were given an exclusive and perpet-
ual right of publication of works. 13 Expiration of licensing legislation
and the emergence of publishers independent of the Stationer's Com-
pany resulted in Parliament's enactment of the Statute of Anne in
1710.14 The Statute of Anne sought to protect authors and their fami-
lies from the damage caused by unauthorized reproduction of their
books.15 A copyright term of fourteen years was granted to the author
upon registration and deposit of a work with an official public li-
brary.16 If the author was alive at the end of this term, he could renew
the copyright for an additional fourteen years.17
The basic principles behind the Statute of Anne have dominated
copyright law throughout American history.' 8 The statute's commit-
ment to the encouragement of learning gave the United States a
framework by which to create its own copyright legislation.19 Early
writers such as Thomas Paine and Noah Webster lobbied to have the
Statute of Anne's concepts incorporated into initial state copyright
laws.20 The framers of the United States Constitution also saw the
need for a uniform system of copyright throughout the states, and
subsequently addressed this issue in the Constitution's provision vest-
ing literary property rights in authors. 21 Article I grants Congress the
9. See id.
10. See GoimAN, supra note 7, at 1.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. With growing resentment of the power of the Stationer's Company, Parlia-
ment actually refused to renew this licensing legislation (know as the Licensing Act of
1667). SeeCHERYL BESENJAK, COPYRIGHT PLAIN AND SIMPLE 20 (1997). The subsequent enact-
ment of the Statute of Anne brought about a period of "author's rights." See id.
15. See GoRMAN, supra note 7, at 1.
16. See LEE, supra note 8, at 14.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See BESENJAK, supra note 14, at 20.
21. See Harriet L. Oler, Copyright Law and the Fair Use of Visual Images, in FAIR USE AND
FREE INQUIRY. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 268, 268 (John Shelton Lawrence &
Bernard Timberg eds., 1980).
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power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings."22 The basic philosophies of copyright are
embodied in this clause, which gives Congress the power to expand or
restrict its provisions in alignment with the objectives of copyright.2 3
The principal purpose of this congressional power is to preserve and
nurture cultural history and welfare in the United States.24 The Fram-
ers sought to accomplish this goal by protecting authors' intellectual
property rights in their creative expressions once those expressions
become fixed in literary, artistic, or musical form.25
The initial federal statutes governing copyrights were enacted by
the first Congress in 1790.26 These statutes provided copyright protec-
tion for maps, charts, and books.27 Subsequent acts gradually ex-
panded the types of work eligible for copyright protection. 28 In an
effort to conform to English law, a general revision of the copyright
laws added musical compositions and cuts29 to the list of copyright-
able works.30 Dramatic performances came under statutory protection
in 1856, whereby authors were "granted the right of public perform-
ance in dramatic compositions already subject to copyright
[protection] "31
The copyright laws were again expanded in 1865, when photo-
graphs and negatives were expressly added to the list of protected
works.32 The commercial value of the photograph emerged through
works such as the famous Civil War photographs of Mathew Brady,
which provided justification for the extension of copyright protection
into this realm of creative works.33 Congress interpreted its power in
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 1-4.
24. See id. at 4.
25. See Oler, supra note 21, at 268.
26. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 9.
27. See id.
28. Specifically, the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976. See
BESENJAK, supra note 14, at 21-22. See also Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1076-77,
repealed by the Copyright Act of 1976; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). See also discussion infra Part
II.
29. To make a "cut" is "to record a speech, musical selection, or other sound on (a
phonograph record)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 560 (1993).
30. See Stephen Lichtenstein et al., Note, Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1270 (1956).
31. Id.
32. See id. See also Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5(j), 35 Stat. 1077, repealed by the
Copyright Act of 1976.
33. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1270.
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this regard granted by the Constitution to be as broad as it wished.
34
In 1870, paintings, drawings, chromos,35 statuettes, and models or de-
signs intended as works of fine art were new additions to the enumer-
ated list of copyrightable works.36
The year 1909 saw a complete revision and reorganization of the
copyright laws.3 7 These changes continue to serve as the basis for
American copyright law today.38 The Copyright Act of 190939 ("1909
Act") used broader language to increase the scope of copyright pro-
tection and wrestle free from the rigid adherence to protecting only
those works specifically enumerated in the original statute. 40 Copy-
right protection was dependent upon a work being published with no-
tice of copyright, as well as subsequent registration and deposit of the
work.41 Copyrights had an initial term of twenty-eight years under the
act, and were renewable for the same period following expiration.
42
Due to the 1909 Act's flexible (but inarticulate) language, it was sub-
ject to frequent ad hoc amendments, providing little guidance during
judicial proceedings. 43 This act distinguished between federal copy-
right protection for published works and state copyright protection
for unpublished works. 44 The most important exclusive rights granted
to the copyright owner under the 1909 Act included printing or other-
wise copying, making adaptations or versions, selling, and public per-
formance. 45 This act is no longer in effect, but it does govern
transactions taking place between 1909 and 1978, many of which are
sources of litigation today.46
34. See id. at 1271.
35. "Chromo" is short for "chromolithograph," which is defined as "a colored picture
produced by making and superimposing multiple lithographs, each of which adds a differ-
ent color." ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (N. Am. Ed. 2001), http://dictionary.
msn.com/find/entry.asp?refid=1861597151&wwi=18 6 24 (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
36. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1271.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by the Copyright Act of 1976.
40. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1271-72.
41. See LEE, supra note 8, at 13. See also Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, §§ 7-10, 35 Stat.
1077-78, repealed by the Copyright Act of 1976.
42. See LEE, supra note 8, at 13.
43. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 2.
44. See id. at 3. Until the Copyright Act of 1976, common law copyright law and state,
rather than federal, law protected unpublished works. See BESENJAK, supra note 14, at 36.
This distinction was subsequently removed in the 1976 Act. See id.
45. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 2.
46. See id. at 2-3.
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Congress and the United States Copyright Office made a major
effort to revise the copyright laws in the United States, and after a
fifteen year study, the dramatic renovations culminated in the Copy-
right Act of 197647 ("1976 Act"). "The ... dual copyright system, with
its dichotomy between state common-law protection for unpublished
works and federal statutory protection for published works, [was] ...
changed to a national copyright system... .-48 Federal copyright pro-
tection became exclusive the moment the author's work was created.49
The distinction between published and unpublished works lost its sig-
nificance as a condition for federal copyright eligibility.50 Lack of
copyright notice was now curable, and registration became permissive
under the 1976 Act.51 Instead of the twenty-eight to fifty-six year dura-
tion provided under the 1909 Act, copyright protection ran for the
life of the author plus fifty years. 52 In 1998, The Sonny Bono Copy-
right Term Extension Act 53 extended protection for an additional
twenty years, and copyright protection became exclusive for seventy
years beyond the life of the author.54 The exclusive rights afforded the
author of a copyrighted work remained virtually unchanged from
those articulated in the 1909 Act, with the addition of the right of
"public display" to take into account transmissions by television and
computer. 55
47. See id. at 3. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
48. HARRY C. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUmE 37 (2d ed. 1988).
49. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 3. For the purposes of copyright law, a work is "cre-
ated" when it is "fixed in a tangible medium of expression." Id. at 3. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
50. See LEE, supra note 8, at 13.
51. See id.
52. See id. Since the life the author cannot efficiently serve as a measure of copyright
duration in works made for hire and anonymous or pseudonymous works, where the iden-
tity of the author is often difficult or impossible to ascertain, these works had a fixed term
of 75 years from publication, or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first. See 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.10, at 3-9 (2001). Follow-
ing the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, these works
now have a fixed term of 95 years from publication, or 120 years from creation, whichever
expires first. See id.
53. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, § 101, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
54. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 22.01, at 5-22. See also Jon M. Garon,
Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 599 (1999) (arguing for, among other things, a repeal of
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, as it would deny little actual pro-
tection to authors).
55. See Go~mAN, supra note 7, at 3.
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In 1988, the Berne Convention Implementation Act56 removed
the condition of notice from copyright legislation.57 Significant
changes came about in 1988 and 1990 in an effort to revise United
States copyright law to conform to the Berne Convention require-
ments. 58 Copyright registration requirements were modified to be
consistent with this convention, although registration is still required
to bring suit.59 In 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act 6° ("VARA") was
enacted to provide support for visual artists, granting them specific
moral rights of attribution to, and integrity in, certain works of visual
art.61
H. The Subject Matter of Copyright
Protection under United States copyright law extends specific
and exclusive rights to authors of all types of literary, artistic, and mu-
sical works. 62 Under the authority of Article I of the Constitution,
Congress is empowered to grant copyright protection to "authors" for
their "writings."63 Codified in section 102, the Copyright Act reads,
"l[c] opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
56. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 1, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
57. See LEE, supra note 8, at 13. The Berne Convention Implementation Act was
signed into law on November 1, 1988. See id. at 20. Effective March 1 of the following year,
this act continued the transformation of copyright law initiated by the 1976 Act. See id. The
key change in the copyright law to bring about Berne compatibility was that notice of
copyright became optional for published works. See id.
58. See GoRmAN, supra note 7, at 3.
59. See id.
60. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, § 601, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990).
61. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 86-87. VARA applies to a very narrow category of
creative works meeting the 1976 Act's definition of "visual art." See Patty Grestenblith, Archi-
tect as Artist: Artists' Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 450
(1994). Section 106A of the 1976 Act governs this issue, along with the definitions found in
that same act. See GORMAN, supra note 7, at 87.
"A work of visual art" is
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the au-
thor and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title VI, § 601, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)-(2)
(2000).
62. See GoRmAN, supra note 7, at 9.
63. See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. '64 Nineteenth century case law interpreted
the term "author" to mean anyone "to whom anything owes its ori-
gin,"65 and "writings" to include "all forms of writing, printing, engrav-
ing .... by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression." 66
To be copyrighted, a work must meet two major requirements:
originality and fixation. 67 First, a work must be an original work of
authorship, or put another way, the work merely must be original to
the author and possess a modicum of creativity. 68 Second, a work must
be fixed in a tangible form from which it can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated. 69
There are eight categories of works protected by copyright.70 As
listed in the 1976 Act, they are: "(1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works."71 A particular work can be placed in one or more, or none, of
these categories and receive copyright protection. 72
64. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
65. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884).
66. Id. at 58. In addressing this issue, one group of scholars noted:
The courts do not define writings as the form of a particular subject matter but
rather they determine if the subject matter meets certain standards or principles
to which all objects, whatever their form, must conform if they are to be entitled
to copyright protection. Writings, thus, are defined not in terms of concrete, tangible
forms, but in terms of principles and standards.
Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1284.
67. See LEE, supra note 8, at 7-8.
68. See id. at 7. This originality requirement is not nearly as stringent as, for example,
the novelty requirement found in patent law. See id. This patent condition requires a pat-
entable invention to be new at the time of discovery. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 3.01, at 3-3 (2001). "[A] prior patent or publication anywhere will negate nov-
elty." Id. at 3-4.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
71. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1)-(8). See also LEE, supra note 8, at 3.
72. See LEE, supra note 8, at 3. The question of how a work can receive copyright
protection without fitting into one of the eight enumerated categories can be answered by
analyzing the 1976 Act's statutory language preceding section 102, which states: "Works of
authorship include the [eight enumerated categories]." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Section
101 provides that the term "including" is "illustrative and not limitative." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000) (emphasis added).
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Courts have emphasized three principles justifying the existence
of copyright protection. First, authors have an inherent right to their
own works. 73 Second, authors have the right to the rewards and fruits
of their labor, thus encouraging further production of copyrightable
works.74 Third, courts have analyzed the public benefit derived from
such encouragement to authors in their creative endeavors. 75 This en-
couragement results in further creation of objects of beauty, thus in-
creasing the public's exposure to and knowledge of the arts and
sciences. 76
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,77 a landmark case in
1884 involving a photograph by Oscar Wilde, the United States Su-
preme Court established that a photograph was deserving of copyright
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of
works accorded protection .... Authors are continually finding new ways of ex-
pressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new ex-
pressive methods will take. [The 1976 Act] does not intend either to freeze the
scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas
completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither
that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that
general area of subject matter would necessarily be unprotected.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976). The fact that a work is not included in
the eight enumerated categories does not automatically disqualify it from copyright protec-
tion. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.03, at 1-2. "If such a new form is sufficiently
analogous to the kinds of works that are expressly protected in the eight categories, it will
be regarded as falling within [the intent of Congress], even though the similarity is only by
analogy." Id.
73. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1290. See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (holding defendant liable for copyright infringement of
a photograph found to be an original work of art and the product of plaintiffs intellectual
invention); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907) (affirming lower court
decision granting respondent replevin of petitioner's copies of a painting after finding
respondent validly bought the reproduction rights to the original painting, and those
rights were protected by the Copyright Act); Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 F. 136 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1907) (holding defendants' photographs of plaintiff's copyrighted sculptures constituted
copyright infringement).
74. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1290. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (holding use by respondents of petitioners' statuettes as bases for table lamps con-
stituted copyright infringement, as the statuettes were original, tangible expressions of the
petitioners' ideas and deserving of copyright protection).
75. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1290. See also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123 (1932) (holding that copyrights were not entitled to exemption from state taxa-
tion after appellant sought to enjoin collection of a tax upon motion picture receipts);
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding that plaintiff
cartoonist's conception of humor was copyrightable, and defendants' subsequent manufac-
ture of a doll based on plaintiffs character deprived the plaintiff of the commercial value
of its copyright and constituted copyright infringement).
76. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1290.
77. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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protection as a "work of art."'78 The Court discussed the origin and
purposes of copyright, stating, "the framers of the Constitution . . .
underst[ood] the nature of copyright and the objects to which it was
commonly applied .... as the exclusive right of a man to the production of
his own genius or intellect ....
In the 1907 case of American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,80 the Su-
preme Court, guided by principles of copyright, prevented the copy-
ing of a painting.8 ' In enforcing the copyright, the Court stated that
the foundation of copyright was the "natural dominion which every
one has over his own ideas... embodied in visible forms or characters
.... "82 An Illinois court of appeal decision, Bracken v. Rosenthal,8 3 held
in that same year that a sculpture deserved copyright protection be-
cause it was
in accord with the reason and spirit of the law.... IT] he copyright
acts "secure to the author the original and natural rights, and it was
said that the various provisions of the law in relation to copyrights
should have a liberal construction, in order to give effect to what
may be considered the inherent right of the author to his own
work. "84
This inherent right, which section eight of Article I grants Con-
gress the power to protect, overlaps with the idea that authors are
entitled to the fruits and rewards of their own labor.8 5 In essence, this
is the right of authors to publish, copy, and sell their works. 86 As the
Court said in Mazer v. Stein,8 7 "[s]acrificial days devoted to such crea-
tive activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services ren-
dered."88 The encouragement of this individual effort by the author
has been said to be the most effective means of advancing the public
welfare89
78. Id. at 60.
79. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
80. 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 291 (quoting 1 BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 436 (Rawles' ed. n.d.)).
83. 151 F. 136 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1907).
84. Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
85. See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 30, at 1291.
86. See id.
87. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
88. Id. at 219.
89. See id.
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M. The Fair Use Doctrine
Possibly the most significant limitation on a copyright owner's ex-
clusive rights finds its form in the fair use doctrine. 90 Gradually mani-
fested in early case law, this doctrine was and is considered an
equitable rule of reason developed by English judges who articulated
a "cohesive set of principles [which] govern[ed] the use of a first au-
thor's work by a subsequent author without the former's consent."91
Future Supreme Court Justice Joseph Storey, sitting as a circuit judge
in Folsom v. Marsh,92 interpreted the principles of the English courts
concerning the fair use exception, and articulated what became the
foundation for the doctrine in future American jurisprudence on the
subject. 9 3
In Folsom, Storey explained that the act of quoting copyrighted
materials for use in a George Washington biography could be justified
or excused, but not "[i] f so much is taken, that the value of the origi-
nal is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are sub-
stantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another."94 He felt it
important to examine the "nature and objects of the selections made,"
as well as the "quantity and value of the materials used."95 Other
courts added to Storey's opinion, emphasizing the need to examine
whether the unauthorized copying of protected material would bene-
fit the public's interest in the free and open dissemination of informa-
tion, and whether the preparation of the allegedly infringing work
90. See GoRMAN, supra note 7, at 93. In the absence of defenses such as the fair use
doctrine, the exclusive rights normally granted under 17 U.S.C. § 106 of the 1976 Act give
a copyright owner the right to seek royalties from those who wish to use the copyrighted
work. See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997).
91. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, Inc. 2d ed. 1995).
92. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (finding copyright infringement
through early fair use analysis where defendant had taken 353 pages of plaintiffis multi-
volume work on George Washington for use in his own Washington biography). While
Justice Storey's articulation of the principles of fair use in this case has been considered the
foundation for American fair use decisions, it has been said that Storey's thoughts concern-
ing the doctrine were actually articulated by him two years earlier in Gray v. Russell, 10 F.
Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728) (involving the scope of protection afforded to
compilations of public domain materials). See PATRY, supra note 91, at 19.
93. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 3.
94. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
95. Id.
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"requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject
matter."96
The fair use doctrine, which emerged as a creature of common
law from holdings and dicta, was not thought to have a concrete pres-
ence in the realm of copyright law.97 Scholars have argued that while
the doctrine has been praised as "entirely equitable and.., so flexible
as virtually to defy definition[,] "98 early English and American case
law is not in line with this claim. 99 Before the doctrine was codified, it
was heavily debated whether the doctrine was deserving of codifica-
tion. 100 Some argued that since the doctrine does "defy definition," 10 1
it would be more beneficial to allow the courts to set the boundaries
of the doctrine and enforce it at their discretion. 102 Since fair use de-
pended upon a variety of factual circumstances, codification in a stat-
ute could not provide any clear guidelines for enforcing the
doctrine. 10 3 Conversely, renowned copyright expert Melville Nimmer
argued that while the fair use doctrine should not attempt to enumer-
ate any specific instances of fair use, it should receive recognition by
express legislation. 10 4
The fair use doctrine was eventually codified in the 1976 Act. 10 5 It
is an affirmative defense, 0 6 only relevant after a plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie showing of copyright infringement. 10 7 There is no
infringement if the alleged copying involves exclusively unprotectible
elements such as ideas, processes, or facts. 10 8 Additionally, there is no
infringement if only insubstantial similarities are present between the
96. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), (applying the fair use doctrine to uphold the use of plaintiffs
magazine articles concerning a celebrity for defendant's autobiography).
97. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 3.
98. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
99. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 4.
100. See id. at 262.
101. Id.
102. See id. This is how the 1909 Act dealt with the issue. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
106. An affirmative defense is defined as: "In pleading, matter asserted by defendant
which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it. A response to a
plaintiffs claim which attacks the plaintiffs legal right to bring an action, as opposed to
attacking the truth of claim." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990).
107. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 413. A prima facie case of copyright infringement
requires the plaintiff to establish copying and substantial similarity between the original
work and the allegedly infringing work. See id.
108. See id.
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copyrightable expression of both works. 10 9 The similarity must involve
copyrightable expressions. 1 10 Once the copying and substantial similar-
ity (and thus, infringement) are established, the court must deter-
mine if the given use is fair. 1 Statutory and case law both serve as
reference points in the court's determination.1 1 2 In codifying the fair
use doctrine, Congress emphasized that the doctrine's statutory recog-
nition intended to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 1 3 However, one
change in the 1976 Act mandated, via use of the word "shall," that the
courts analyze the affirmative defense of fair use in accordance with
the four factors enumerated in section 107.114 The 1976 Act provides
the statutory foundation for the fair use doctrine:
[N] otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit ed-
ucational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors. 1 1
5
It should be noted that the six purposes delineated in the pream-
ble to section 107 are illustrative, not exclusive.1 1 6 In addition, the
mere fact that an allegedly infringing use fits into one of these catego-
109. See id.
110. See id. "Copyrightable" expressions are those expressions satisfying the require-
ments necessary to obtain copyright protection. See GoRMAN, supra note 7, at 9.
111. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 413.
112. See id.
113. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 62 (1975).
114. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 414.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (emphasis added).
116. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 418. The six purposes delineated in the statute are:
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
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ries does not make it presumptively fair. 117 While the four statutory
factors must all be analyzed in order to determine whether the appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine is appropriate, courts are not limited to
them. 118 "No relative weight is assigned to any individual factor, in
order to permit the courts to tailor their inquiry to the circumstances
of each case."' 19 Where relevant, additional factors are taken into con-
sideration.1 20 In light of constant technological advances, Congress in-
tended to create a flexible doctrine capable of adjustment. 121
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor of* the fair use analysis, a factor which arguably
should be more relevant and determinative in the specific situations
detailed in this Comment, provides guidance on acceptable or unac-
ceptable fair use applications. The purpose of this factor was clarified
in a 1975 House Report:
The Committee has amended the first of the criteria to be consid-
ered-"the purpose and character of the use"-to state explicitly
that this factor includes a consideration of "whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes." This
amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-
profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an
express recognition that, as under the present law, the commercial
or nonprofit character of an activity, while not conclusive with re-
spect to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other fac-
tors in fair use decisions. 122
This factor considers the type of use being made of the copy-
righted work to be determinative, not the status of the entity making
the use.' 23 Justification lies in the fact that the type of use and the
117. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 418.
118. See id. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) ("Nor
may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.").
119. PATRY, supra note 91, at 418.
120. In the past, courts have looked to, among other things, whether a work was pub-
lished or unpublished in making its determination of fair use applicability. See LEE, supra
note 8, at 56. In response to these judicial interpretations, Congress passed the "Unpub-
lished Work Fair Use Act" on October 24, 1992. See id. Intending to nullify an author's
argument that the unpublished status of a work in itself negates the fair use defense, the
Act added the following sentence to section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976: "The fact
that a work is not published shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of [the four factors]." Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) ("The bill endorses the
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to
freeze the doctrine in statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.").
122. Id.
123. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 420.
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status of the entity do not necessarily coincide. 124 A nonprofit entity
may engage in clearly commercial practices while using a copyrighted
work.125 By contrast, an entity traditionally earning profit may partake
in nonprofit activities. 126 The Supreme Court stated in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 127 "the mere fact that a use is educational and
not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of
fairness." 128
Analysis of the commercial or nonprofit educational aspects of a
given entity making use of a copyrighted work does not, however, end
the inquiry.129 Since inclusion in one of these categories constitutes
but a single aspect of an entity's multifaceted purpose, courts may
reach beyond this blanket categorization and analyze other attributes
of the purpose and character of the use. 130 It is unfortunately difficult
to neatly categorize all uses as either commercial or nonprofit educa-
tional.' 31 For example, not all nonprofit uses are educational, and
often commercial uses may have nonprofit motives.13 2
Early interpretations of the first factor did not include the com-
mercial versus nonprofit educational distinction. 33 Disheartened edu-
cators who had unsuccessfully lobbied for a blanket exception in
copyright law for nonprofit educational uses played a large role in the
1976 codification of this distinction. 34 This phrase of the fair use stat-
ute was intended to pacify a displeased interest group, and while not
intended to affect the substance of the fair use doctrine, it plays an
important role (and arguably should play a more important role) in
the analysis. 135
Commentators have proposed that the commercial nature of the
use is often a matter of degree, and should be placed on a continuum
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (reversing an appellate court's finding of fair use in defen-
dant's use of plaintiffs copyrighted song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," as a parody for defendant's
own rap song, "Pretty Woman").
128. Id. at 584.
129. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 420.
130. See id. at 420-21. This could include an analysis of whether the copyrightable ma-
terial was used for the purposes of criticism or comment. See id. at 421.
131. See id. at 420.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 421-22.
135. See id.
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to determine its weight. 136 One end of the continuum, an end the
defense would surely favor, would be use by a nonprofit institution for
educational purposes (not charging a fee).137 The other end of the
continuum would be use of a particular copyrighted work for the pur-
pose of promoting or selling a commercial product or service.' 38 "If
the use is commercial rather than nonprofit, it is presumed to be un-
fair .... -"139 Those instances positioned somewhere in the middle of
this continuum present the difficulty in determining whether or not a
use is commercial. 140
In analyzing the first factor, courts often determine whether the
use was primarily for entertainment or scholarship, and whether the
use brings profit.141 Thus, the courts can focus on the public benefit
derived from the use. 142 When the use is characterized as entertain-
ment, courts tend to find the commercial nature favors the plaintiff
alleging infringement.143
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,144 the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the transformative nature of a work is crucial in this part of
the fair use analysis.' 45 In deciding whether the rap group 2 Live
Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman" constituted
fair use, it was necessary to consider whether the subsequent work
"merely supersede[d]" the former work, or actually "add[ed] some-
thing new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning or message. 'q 46 The process of cre-
ating a transformative work tends to promote the overarching goals of
copyright law, and thus will weigh against other factors which often
preclude a finding of fair use, such as commercialism. 47
136. See id. at 422.
137. See id. at 423.
138. See id.
139. GoRmAN, supra note 7, at 95.
140. See id.
141. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 425.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 426. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (holding that use of a
short story in Alfred Hitchcock's Rear Window was for commercial, not educational,
purposes).
144. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
145. See id. at 579.
146. Id.
147. See id. See also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 13.05, at 4-13. "Although such
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copy-
right, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transforma-
tive works.. . ." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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Unfortunately, the first factor in the fair use analysis does not
have a strong enough emphasis in certain situations. More emphasis
should be placed on this factor when works of fine art are being used
for commercial purposes.148 As stated in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,'49 " [t] he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.' ' 50
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Legislative history and case law are distinctly lacking in this sec-
ond factor, which examines the nature of the copyrighted work.'
5
'
Typically receiving little attention, this factor comes into play in the
judicial distinction between "informational" and "entertainment"
works (that is, factual and nonfactual works).152 If an informational
work is at issue, a court weighs the second factor in the defendant's
favor. 153 Conversely, the plaintiff is favored if an entertainment work
is involved. 154 Supreme Court Justice Blackmun explained this ratio-
nale in his dissenting opinion in Sony Corp. of America, v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.155 He stated, "informational works, such as news reports,
that readily lend themselves to productive use by others, are less pro-
tected than creative works of entertainment."' 56 This theory has been
criticized, however, since many informational works contain and re-
quire a substantially greater amount of creativity than some creative,
nonfactual works. 157
Section 107 of the 1976 Act acknowledges this alleged inconsis-
tency and narrows the scope of the fair use doctrine when applied to
factual works such as newsletters, standardized tests, textbooks, and
148. See generally Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
149. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
150. Id. at 562.
151. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 504.
152. See id. at 505.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 505-06. Examples given by Patry for creative nonfac-
tual works which require arguably less creativity than factual works (such as computer pro-
grams and test questions) are "formula romances and thrillers found in airport and
grocery stores." Id.
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periodicals for the educational market. 158 The legislative justification
for this codified detail is that the taking of even a small portion of this
material may harm a copyright owner's potential market.159 Many
scholars opine that a broad, general rule encompassing the fair use
doctrine should be shunned in favor of a case by case approach which
takes the specifics of a situation into account. 60 The vast list of works
protected by copyright may quite possibly contain both "informa-
tional" and "creative" components, and their existence would frustrate
the application of a general rule.16'
The massive renovation of the copyright laws in the 1976 Act fo-
cused little attention on the interests of fine artists. 162 As a result, fair
use and fine art issues were included within discussions concerning
the proposed educational exemption, nonprofit broadcasting, and
"the exclusion of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works from the li-
brary photocopying exemption [found in] [s] ection 108 [of the 1976
Act]"163 When fine art is the subject of an alleged infringement, the
second factor tends to weigh in favor of plaintiffs who argue against
the fair use of their copyrighted works. 164 Unfortunately, this factor
often receives too little attention in the fair use analysis. 165
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in Relation
to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole
Nineteenth century English courts aptly articulated the third fac-
tor of the fair use analysis, a factor concerned with the "amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole,"1 66 in an early case stating:
When it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague.
One writer might take all the vital part of another's book, though it
might be but a small proportion of the book in quantity. It is not
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
159. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 506.
160. See id. See also Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323)
(finding against copyright infringement because defendant's work was too different from
plaintiffs work to be an abridgment); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
161. PATRY, supra note 91, at 507.
162. See id. at 526.
163. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
164. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 526.
165. See discussion supra Part III.B.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
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only quantity, but value that is always looked to. It is useless to refer
to any particular cases as to quantity.
167
Supreme Court Justice Storey's opinions adhered to this principle in
both Gray v. Russell'68 and Folsom v. Marsh,169 and the Supreme Court
subsequently dealt with the issue in Harper & Row, Publishers.170 The
defendant in this 1985 case admitted to copying 300 to 400 words
from President Gerald Ford's then-unpublished autobiography.'
7 1
The Court found this sufficient to satisfy a prima facie case of infringe-
ment because the defendant "took what was essentially the heart of
the book.' 72
Since the passage of the 1976 Act, it has generally been held that
fair use as an affirmative defense will be rejected if an entire or sub-
stantial portion of the work is copied.17 3 This raises the question of
why the fair use defense has been upheld in instances where an entire
photograph or painting has been copied for use in a commercial
enterprise.
D. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for, or Value
of, the Copyrighted Work
The rights enumerated in sections 106 and 106A of the Copyright
Act govern the scope of the potential market in the fourth factor of
the fair use analysis. 174 The potential market encompasses more than
just the sale of copies of the work in its original form; it addresses the
effect the allegedly infringing use will have upon the market for the
author's derivative works as well. 175 The importance of the derivative
167. Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.) 737, 738 (1836) (dissolving an injunction
in favor of defendant, who had allegedly copied plaintiffs work for use in his own treatise
concerning the passage of private bills in England).
168. 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1039 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
169. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
170. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
171. See id. at 539.
172. Id. at 564-65.
173. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 552-53.
174. See id. at 557. Section 106 in essence grants exclusive rights in copyrighted works
to authors, protecting their rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords, perform their work publicly, display their work publicly, or
perform it publicly by means of digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Section 106A covers artists' rights of attribution and integrity, granting them the right to
claim authorship of their works, to prevent the use of their names in works they did not
create, and to prevent the distortion, mutilation, or other modification of their work which
would prejudice their honor or reputation. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
175. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 557. A derivative work is defined as:
[A] work based on a pre-existing work, such as a translation, musical arrange-
ment, fictionalization, motion picture version, abridgment or any other form in
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market should not be underestimated, as it often represents an eco-
nomically important element of the copyright owner's market and is
crucial to the incentives that underlie copyright law. 176
It is also important not to extend the scope of a copyrighted
work's potential market too broadly, since a potential market could
always exist for a copyright owner should he choose to license his
work in that market.' 77 The Supreme Court in Campbell articulated the
scope of the potential market as examined in this fourth factor.'78
Justice Souter explained, "the market for potential derivative uses in-
cludes only those that creators of original works would in general de-
velop or license others to develop."1 79 It is significant that the
potential market does not include uses or areas the plaintiff has
clearly refused to license. This factor gives (or should give) copyright
holders the right and the ability to control where and in what manner
their works are distributed or displayed.' 80
The proper focus of the fourth factor is on the harm arising from
the ability of the alleged infringer's use of the copyrighted work to
supplant the plaintiffs work in the marketplace.' 8 ' However, the al-
leged infringer need not turn a profit or charge for his work in order
to cause harm to the plaintiff s market. 82
The Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers issued an opinion
which became a source of confusion for those who sought to apply the
fourth factor of the fair use analysis. 183 The Court classified the fourth
factor as "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use."' 8 4 The Supreme Court later quoted this phrase in the 1990 case
of Stewart v. Abend.' 85 Lower courts were consistently, although mistak-
enly, guided by this phrase in the application of the fourth factor.'8 6
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted .... Only the holder of
copyright in the underlying work (or one acting with his permission) may pre-
pare a derivative work. The preparation of such a work by any other party consti-
tutes infringement.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 444 (6th ed. 1990).
176. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 557.
177. See id. at 557.
178. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
179. Id.
180. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 558-59.
181. See id. at 560.
182. See id.
183. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
184. Id. at 566.
185. See 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
186. See, e.g., Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding
defendants' use of plaintiffs copyrighted work because it did not exhibit the modicum of
[Vol. 36
This eventually forced the Supreme Court to clarify the issue in 1994
in Campbell 187 Justice Souter explained:
[T]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules .... [T]he
statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for [a] case-by-case
analysis .... Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isola-
tion, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.188
No single factor should carry so much weight as to constitute a
bright-line rule; instead, a case by case analysis will provide the basis
for weighing one factor more heavily than another. 8 9 Prior to the
1976 codification of the fair use doctrine, courts were free to apply
whichever factors were relevant in a given situation; they even had the
liberty to ignore one or more of the factors. 190 While section 107
states that all four factors "shall" be analyzed in a fair use analysis, any
one of the factors may be of equal or greater importance in any partic-
ular case. 19 ' "A use may be fair despite some harm to the potential
market if its social value is high; a use may not be fair despite a lack of
harm if it takes extensively for no socially valuable purpose."1 92 A case
by case analysis will enable this "equitable rule of reason" to be ap-
plied fairly, with the particulars of each case affecting which factors
deserve greater influence.
E. Case Law
A look at the following examples will clarify why-in certain cir-
cumstances and in order to achieve equitable results-factors other
than the fourth are of greater importance in the fair use analysis, and
why the Supreme Court's above-noted statement in Campbell is
correct.'
93
creativity required for copyright protection, and the portions that did exhibit sufficient
creativity were nonetheless available to the defendants after an analysis of the four factors
of the fair use doctrine); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding defendant operators of an audio/video reporting service liable for copyright in-
fringement of plaintiffs' video clips through an analysis of the four factors of the fair use
doctrine).
187. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
188. Id. at 577-78.
189. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 563-64.
190. See id. at 560.
191. See id. at 562. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
192. PATRY, supra note 91, at 563.
193. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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1. Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc.1 9 4
Plaintiff Earl Jackson ('Jackson") is an African American artist
who distributed his copyrighted artwork throughout the United
States, and specifically, to an art gallery in Oakland County, Michigan.
His work includes two copyrighted paintings entitled Following the Path
and A Place of Crossing.1 95 Both are pieces of fine art portraying rights
of passage of young Africans and traditional African ceremonies cele-
brating the passage of youth into adulthood. 96
Defendant Warner Brothers, Inc. ("Warner Brothers") allegedly
purchased these two original works for use in their feature film, Made
in America.19 7 In the film, Whoopie Goldberg portrays Sarah, the
owner of "The African Queen," a bookstore which sells African Ameri-
can books and other cultural items. 198 Ted Danson plays Hal, a Cauca-
sian car salesman who is the biological father of Sarah's daughter
Zora. 19 9 Sarah's home is decorated with African art, and during two
scenes in the film, EarlJackson's paintings are displayed on the wall in
her living room.20 0 Clearly seen in the background, Sarah and Hal,
engaged in a passionate kiss, accidentally bump into Jackson's Follow-
ing the Path painting, nearly knocking it off the wall.20 1 The painting
remains uneven for the duration of the scene. 20 2 In a second scene,
Jackson's paintings appeared for a total of approximately sixty
seconds.203
Jackson initiated an action against Warner Brothers in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging copyright in-
fringement for Warner Brothers' use of his artwork in the film. 20 4
Jackson claimed that Warner Brothers' use of his paintings consti-
tuted a violation of section 107 of the 1976 Act, since Warner Brothers
never contracted with Jackson to use his two paintings in the film. 20 5
Jackson also maintained that since he considers the film to be "cultur-
194. 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
195. See id. at 586.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 586-87.
203. See id. at 587. After reviewing the pertinent portion of the movie, the court de-
cided thatJackson's other painting, A Place of Crossing, was not clearly shown. See id. at 586
n.2.
204. See id. at 587.
205. See id.
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ally exploitative," he would never have allowed his paintings to be
used.206
Warner Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that there were no issues of material fact.20 7 The defendant argued it
was entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use under the 1976 Act
because the art was used only as a prop and the display of Jackson's
artwork in their movie did not violate the copyright law. 20 8 For the
reasons set forth below, the court ruled in favor of Warner Brothers,
allowing the use of Jackson's paintings because it was within the scope
of the fair use doctrine.20 9
Initially, the district court described the two requirements neces-
sary to successfully assert a claim of copyright infringement.210 First,
ownership of a valid copyright must be found, and second, there must
be copying of the protected work by the alleged infringer. 211 Jackson's
copyright ownership was not in dispute. 212 The issue before the court
was whether Warner Brothers' display of Jackson's paintings in the
film constituted a fair use.21 3 The burden was on Warner Brothers to
establish that the copying was justified under the fair use doctrine, as
analyzed under the four factors articulated in section 107 of the 1976
Act.2
14
a. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The court determined that Warner Brothers' use of Jackson's
paintings in the film was clearly commercial.2 1 5 As set forth by the
Supreme Court in Campbell, "the fact that a publication was commer-
cial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use."2 1 6 Jackson strongly objected to the man-
ner in which his paintings were used in the film. 21 7 He argued that
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 592.
210. See id. at 588.
211. See id.
212. See id. Jackson registered Following the Path for copyright in 1991. See id. Having
determined that Jackson's other painting, A Place of Crossing, was not clearly shown, the
court did not consider it in the fair use analysis. See id. at 588 n.2.
213. See id. at 588.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (quoting Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 439 (1985)).
217. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 588.
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since his works portray traditional African rites of passage into adult-
hood by young males and females, it was inappropriate to display his
works in a film he believed exploited the very culture he sought to
truthfully represent. 218
In its defense, Warner Brothers relied upon Amsinck v. Columbia
Pictures Industries,219 a New York appellate decision which stated that
the issue is not whether the sole motive of the defendant is monetary
gain, but "whether the user stands to profit from its exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price."220 Warner
Brothers also analogized to Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
Inc.,221 in which the defendant argued that the commercial nature of
the television program was undercut by the fact that the defendant's
use of the plaintiffs art work did not encourage viewers to watch the
show or otherwise promote its sale.2 22
The court reasoned that while the Warner Brothers' movie was
clearly a commercial project, Jackson's paintings never became the
movie's focus. 223 They were not used in the movie's advertisements,
nor were the works used to increase sales for the movie. 224 The court
concluded that Warner Brothers' use could not be said to have ex-
ploited Jackson's paintings.2 25 Moreover, Warner Brothers did not
stand to gain a profit from Jackson's work without paying the custom-
ary price.2 26 The use of the paintings was seen, in the language of the
court, as "fleeting and impermanent,"227 and not a copy for the pur-
poses of a copyright infringement action. 228 Despite the obvious com-
mercial nature of the defendant's use of Jackson's artwork, the first
factor in the fair use analysis weighed in favor of Warner Brothers.
218. See id.
219. 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Amsinck, the artist created a design of pastel
colored teddy bears licensed for use in a musical mobile suspended over a baby's crib. See
id. at 1045. Defendant Columbia Pictures Industries included the mobile in a film about a
family that wanted to adopt a child. See id. at 1045-46.
220. Id. at 1049 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 504).
221. 126 F.3d 70 (1997). In Ringgo/d, a copyright infringement suit was brought against
Black Entertainment Television for its use of the plaintiff Ringgold's art work entitled
Church Picnic. See id. at 72. The art work was included as part of the background set of a
television show called ROC. See id.
222. See id. at 73.
223. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 589.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 590.
228. See id.
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b. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Jackson argued that his work was only licensed in specific, limited
markets that embrace and represent his ideals.229 His subjects are
mostly African Americans, and his work serves to further Afrocentric
principles and beliefs.230
The court found that Jackson's work was composed of elements
of creativity, imagination, and originality, and found the second factor
weighed in favor of the artist.23 1 The court did not, however, place
much emphasis on this factor-an approach consistent with the rela-
tively limited legislative and case history of this section of the fair use
analysis.
c. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Warner Brothers contended that the use ofJackson's paintings in
the movie was so insubstantial as to be de minimis. 232 The defendants
relied on the Amsinck court's analysis, which stated, "[i]n situations
where the copyright owner suffers no demonstrable harm from the
use of the work, fair use overlaps with the legal doctrine of de
minimis, requiring a finding of no liability for infringement."233
The district court found that since Jackson had not shown that
adverse action was taken against his work as a result of Warner Broth-
ers' inclusion of it in the film, this factor of the fair use analysis fa-
vored the defendants.234 Jackson's "personal affront to the manner in
which his art work was used" was not enough to sway the court's deci-
sion regarding this factor. 23 5 According to the court, Warner Broth-
ers' showing of Jackson's work for less than sixty seconds supported
the fair use assertion. 236
d. The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market
In analyzing the fourth factor, the Jackson court reiterated the Su-
preme Court's position in Campbell, requiring that, in examining the
effect of the use upon the potential market, courts should
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
234. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 590.
235. Id.
236. See id.
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consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particu-
lar actions of the alleged infringer, but also "whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market" for the original.... The enquiry "must take into account
not only harm to the original but also ... harm to the market for
derivative works." 237
The court decided thatJackson's work would not be adversely affected
in "profitability or popularity, '" 23 and that he had not articulated a
harm cognizable under the 1976 Act.239 While finding merit in the
artist's argument that the Warner Brothers film was culturally ex-
ploitative, it did not find that contention persuasive enough to hold
this factor in his favor.240 It found Jackson unable to prove that the
relevant market in which his work was sold suffered adverse conse-
quences. 24 1 In its conclusion, the court stated, "[t]he overall inquiry
for analyzing the fair use doctrine is whether a reasonable author
would consent to the use." 242
2. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.
In Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.,243 plaintiff Jorge Antonio
Sandoval ("Sandoval"), an artist and photographer who resided and
worked in Southern California, created a series of fifty-two untitled
photographs depicting himself in a variety of unusual poses. 24 4 Pic-
tures of the artist with his face tightly wrapped in wire, covered in soap
bubbles, or apparently lying on a bed of thorns are examples of the
content of these photographs.2 45 Sandoval undisputedly owned the
copyright to these works, which were untitled, unpublished, and never
publicly shown (and were never intended to be) .246
Defendant New Line Cinema Corporation ("New Line") pro-
duced and began distribution of the feature film Seven in 1995.247 The
movie depicts a deranged photographer who commits a series of grisly
murders, each based upon one of the seven deadly sins recognized by
237. Id. at 590-91 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 591.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. Id. at 592 (quoting Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 840
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).-
243. 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
244. See id. at 216.
245. See id.
246. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
247. See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 216.
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the Roman Catholic Church. 248 Approximately one hour and sixteen
minutes into the movie, the photographer's apartment is searched by
two investigators seeking evidence linking him to the murders.249 On
the rear wall of the suspect's apartment is a light box, upon which are
several photographic transparencies. 250 Both Sandoval and New Line
agreed that of these transparencies, ten were reproductions of Sando-
val's self-portraits. 251 The light box is subsequently illuminated and
Sandoval's photographs are shown in as many as ten camera shots to-
taling approximately thirty seconds.252 The photographs are either
obstructed or out of focus during that period.253 It was admittedly dif-
ficult but possible for the artist and two unnamed parties to identify
the works as Sandoval's. 254 The artist filed suit alleging copyright in-
fringement, seeking an injunction from further distribution and dis-
play of the film, as well as actual and statutory damages.255 New Line
contended that the "fleeting and insignificant use" of the photo-
graphs constituted fair use under section 107 of the 1976 Act.25 6 The
district court upheld New Line's use of Sandoval's photographs under
the fair use doctrine, 257 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit subsequently affirmed the decision, holding that the use of the
artist's photographs was de minimis. 258 For the purposes of this Com-
ment, it is necessary to review the district court's analysis of the case
pursuant to the four factors articulated in section 107, as well as the
reasons why the decision was affirmed on appeal.
a. The District Court's Analysis of the Fair Use Factors
(1) Purpose and Character of the Use
The district court first analyzed whether or not the use by New
Line was of a commercial or nonprofit nature.259 The court de-em-
phasized this factor, however, because the Second Circuit had recently
explained that most secondary users seek at least some minimal
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
253. See Sandoval 147 F.3d at 216.
254. See Sandova4 973 F. Supp. at 409, 411.
255. See id. "Sandoval subsequently withdrew his privacy and emotional distress claims."
Id. at 411 n.4.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 414.
258. See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 216.
259. See Sandoval 973 F. Supp. at 412.
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amount of commercial gain from their use.26° The court also ex-
amined whether New Line's use could be considered
transformative. 26'
The court decided that the use was clearly commercial, but also
transformative "in the sense that defendants used the visual images
created in plaintiff's work in furtherance of the creation of a distinct
visual aesthetic and overall mood for the moviegoer watching the
scene in the killer's apartment." 262 It found that the defendants did
not use Sandoval's work in the promotion of Seven, nor were they try-
ing to directly exploit the artist's theoretical market. 263 While the use
was ultimately deemed commercial, the district court determined that
the transformative nature of New Line's use caused the first factor to
weigh in favor of the defendant.264
(2) The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The district court disposed of this factor quickly, finding Sando-
val's photographs were creative and original works of art.265 It empha-
sized that since the unpublished nature of a copyrighted work favors
rejection of the fair use doctrine, the fact that Sandoval had not yet
publicly displayed his work helped shift this second factor in his
favor.266
(3) The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
In its analysis of the third factor, the district court explained that
the "fleeting and obscured use of plaintiff's work did not and cannot
capture the essence or value of the plaintiff's work."26 7 Although the
works were used in their entirety-which normally favors the plaintiff
and weighs against a finding of fair use-the court held that since the
photographs were barely identifiable by the ordinary viewer "concen-
trating on the foreground action," it declined a finding precluding
fair use.268
260. See id. at 412-13.
261. See id. at 413.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 413-14.
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(4) The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market
The district court cited the Supreme Court's statement in Harper
& Row, Publishers269 which read, "[the fourth factor] is undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use."270 Although the court
went on to mention the Supreme Court's more recent clarification in
Campbell that the fourth factor was not necessarily the most important
element,271 this did not seem to affect the outcome of the Sandoval
case.2 72 In explaining the purpose of this factor, the Sandoval court
stated, "[t]his factor requires courts to consider not only the extent of
market harm caused by the specific use in question, but the effect that
would occur if that type of use became widespread. '" 2 73
In holding that the fourth factor weighed in favor of New Line,
the district court determined that the market potential and value of
Sandoval's work was not adversely affected, since it was difficult to
identify the artist's work in the film. 274 The court stated that "[e]ven
widespread uses of Sandoval's [p]hotographs in such a fleeting, ob-
scured, and out-of-focus manner could not begin to encroach on the
potential market for his work. In short, this important factor weighs
decidedly in defendants' favor." 275
b. The Second Circuit's Analysis
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that New
Line's use of Sandoval's photographs was de minimis, and affirmed
the district court's application of the fair use doctrine. 276 The court
stated that the district court erred in its fair use analysis in not first
determining whether the New Line's use was de minimis in nature.277
"To establish that the infringement of a copyright is de minimis, and
therefore not actionable, the alleged infringer must demonstrate that
the copying of the protected material is so trivial 'as to fall below the
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a re-
quired element of actionable copying."278
269. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
270. Id. at 566. See also Sandova4 973 F. Supp. at 414.
271. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
272. See Sandova4 973 F. Supp. at 414.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998).
277. See id. at 217.
278. Id. (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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V. The Problem
The confusing and often inconsistent application of the fair use
doctrine's four factors creates difficulties for courts in determining
whether there has been copyright infringement in any given case. An
analysis of existing case law does not clearly reveal which factors are
the most important in any given situation. The frequently influential
fourth factor, dealing with the effect upon the potential market of the
copyrighted work, has been given the most judicial attention. Label-
ing it "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,"
the Supreme Court gave deference to the fourth factor in Harper &
Row, Publishers.279 Subsequent lower courts agreed, at least until the
Supreme Court's clarification in Campbell.280 Perhaps the Harper &
Row, Publishers description of the fourth factor, however, still remains,
if only subtly, in the minds of judges.
The fourth factor may indeed be the most important factor in
certain situations.281 "Certainly where there is proof of actual harm to
the market, as in [Harper & Row, Publishers], this factor should weigh
heavily in the balance."282 But in some circumstances, any one of the
other three factors may play a more crucial role in determining the
scope and applicability of the fair use doctrine. 283 An alleged in-
fringer's use of a copyrighted work could be considered fair despite
some harm to the potential market, provided the social value of that
use is high. 284 Conversely, "a use may not be fair despite a lack of
harm if it takes extensively for no socially valuable purpose."285 A
plaintiff should not lose simply because the fourth factor was not held
in his favor.286 Rather, specific situations require individualized
analysis.
Jackson and Sandoval illustrate two situations in which courts
should give more attention to the other factors of the fair use doc-
trine. "The basic purpose of copyright is to enrich our society's wealth
of culture and information. The means for doing so is to grant exclusive
rights in the exploitation and marketing of a work as an incentive to those who
create it."28 7 As a limitation to this exclusive protection, the fair use
279. 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
280. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 564.
281. See id. at 563.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. GoRMAN, supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis added).
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doctrine prevents a copyright owner's rights from detrimentally affect-
ing the public's interest in the dissemination of knowledge, and unau-
thorized copying must be tolerated by copyright owners if they do not
suffer adverse economic consequences. 288
The Jackson and Sandoval cases illustrate situations which clash
with fundamental principles of copyright law. First, a strong argument
can be made that the public's interest in the dissemination of knowl-
edge would not be hindered by preventing Hollywood movie studios
from including individual artist's work in films without express au-
thorization. The courts in both cases mentioned that the ordinary
viewer barely noticed the inclusion of the works in the films. This
could also be construed in favor of the artist: If the amount of the
artist's work included in the film was so minimal that the public was
not benefiting from its presence, then the public will surely not be
injured by its absence. Other works could easily be substituted for the
non-permitted works.
Second, courts have paid specific attention to the economic
repercussions upon an artist's work when applying the fair use doc-
trine. 28 9 Consequently, the fourth factor has often been held to be the
most important of the four statutory factors. 290 Perhaps the situations
of artists like Earl Jackson and Jorge Antonio Sandoval strike more of
a moral chord than a financial one. Courts have long held that if an
artist did not suffer adverse financial consequences, a finding of fair
use would usually result. The courts determined just that in both Jack-
son and Sandoval. Neither artist could prove harm to their potential
market. In Sandoval, however, the photographer never even intended to
market his work.2 91 His photographs were unpublished, untitled, and
never publicly shown. 292 While the district court in Sandoval acknowl-
edged the Supreme Court's clarification in Campbell, explaining that
the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine was in fact not always the
most important, the factor analyzing the effect on the artist's potential
market still appears to be the most influential. 293 Referring to this fac-
tor, the district court in Sandoval stated, "[i]n short, this important
factor weighs decidedly in defendants' favor."294 The other three fac-
tors may have received short shrift in comparison to how the district
288. See id. at 93.
289. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 561.
290. See id.
291. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
292. See id.
293. See id. at 414.
294. Id.
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court interpreted the fourth. In affirming the district court's decision,
the Second Circuit never addressed the manner in which the lower
court handled this factor.
Intuitively, when copyrighted works of fine art are used in com-
mercial enterprises without authorization or remuneration, the justifi-
cation is elusive. The fair use doctrine allows the use of copyrighted
materials in some circumstances, thereby promoting the "[p] rogress
of Science and the useful Arts." 29 5 Allowing access to certain works,
such as factual or utilitarian creations or educational materials, is in
accord with this principle. Society can benefit tangibly from this access
through educational and technological advancement and, ultimately,
further creation and invention. Through the fair use doctrine, inter-
preted inflexibly in Jackson and Sandoval, society's progress may be im-
peded by inhibiting creation. Ultimately, this will hinder the
advancement which occurs through improvement upon previous
works. Pinpointing the interest in using the copyrighted works of an
artist or a photographer without compensation is a difficult task. Is
there a specific advancement that will be made by allowing the use?
While the secondary user needs access in order to build upon what
has gone before, this need not happen in every circumstance. Rather,
a secondary user is reaping what they have not sown,2 9 6 and should be
forced to take appropriate measures in order to secure permission for
the use of an artist's copyrighted work.
V. The Solution
To reiterate the warning in Campbell against bright line rules con-
cerning the fourth factor, the Supreme Court stated, "the statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for a case-by-case analysis .... Nor may
the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All
are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright."297
When an artist's work of fine art is used by a secondary user for
commercial gain, the first two factors of the fair use analysis should
play a more important role. Both the purpose and character of the use and
the nature of the work should be analyzed in accord with the purposes of
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
296. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (holding that the
plaintiff's interest in the news it gathered was worthy of protection from interference by
defendant business competitor).
297. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
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copyright law.2 98 If the balance is shifted in instances such as those
described above, an artist's right to control the manner in which his
work is publicly displayed should have a more substantial role in the
analysis.
In both Jackson and Sandoval, the artists produced works of obvi-
ous creativity and originality.299 The paintings depicting African an-
cestral ceremonies by Jackson and the self-portraits of the
photographer Sandoval did not serve clear utilitarian purposes.300
Both were used in a definitively commercial enterprise-the motion
picture industry.30 1 The question should be asked: What public good
is served by allowing these works to be used against the artists' will?
Entertainment value, possibly. But does that supersede the principles
of copyright law to protect these artists' rights to the fruits of their
labor? There was no knowledge or information to be extrapolated
from the use of Jackson's and Sandoval's works. To state again appro-
priate language from Mazer v. Stein, "[s] acrificial days devoted to such
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered."30 2
In his paintings, Jackson depicted scenes of African ancestral cer-
emonies integral to his cultural ideals and beliefs. 30 3 Jackson had the
right to prevent his works from being used in a motion picture that he
felt exploited the very culture he was trying to preserve. Should he
wish not to have his work associated with Warner Brothers, he should
have that right-a right consistent with the principles of copyright
law. Interestingly, the court in Jackson asked whether a reasonable au-
thor would consent to the use of the work in the film. 3 0 4 An objective
standard does not, however, seem appropriate when the reasons Jack-
son protested the use of his work were cultural and religious. They
were reasons personal to him. On the same note, Sandoval had a right
to control the dissemination of his photographs and the medium in
which they were displayed. Those rights are clearly enumerated in the
1976 Act.30 5 The fact that Sandoval never published, titled, or publicly
298. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
299. SeeJackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Sandoval v.
New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
300. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 590; Sandoval, 973 F. Supp. at 413.
301. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 588; Sandoval, 973 F. Supp. at 413.
302. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
303. See Jackson, 993 F. Supp. at 586.
304. See id. at 592.
305. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). See also discussion supra Part I.
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displayed any of the prints clearly illuminates his right to have more
control, despite the de minimis nature of New Line's use.3
0 6
To grant greater weight to the first two factors of the fair use anal-
ysis in these situations would bestow an artist of fine art with more
control over when, where, and how her work is expressed. Adjusting
the fair use analysis in this manner may also turn certain infringement
cases in the artist's favor. If the secondary use is clearly commercial,
then that secondary user is standing to profit from an artist's work
without providing the artist with just compensation. Instead, courts
have tended to focus on the substantiality of the amount used and the
effect upon the potential market.307 If the work had no market, the artists
should not lose the right to control its display simply because they
chose to keep it private. This defies logic, and does not seem to be a
fair use under a doctrine answering to the same name. While granting
injunctions in both Jackson and Sandoval to stop further distribution
and performance of the respective movies is neither a realistic nor
appropriate remedy, just compensation is due the artists whose work
was used in these commercial enterprises, even if some courts could
label the use de minimis.
Conclusion
In the interests ofjudicial economy, certain situations are so min-
imally invasive that the judicial system can choose not to spend valua-
ble time and resources resolving them. There are, however, situations
where judicial intervention is necessary. The two situations above illus-
trate the need for judicial intervention when copyrighted works of
fine art are used in commercial enterprises without the express con-
sent of the artists or some type of remuneration. Had these artists
been permitted the opportunity to refuse to allow their works to be
shown, film companies as large as the respective defendants would
surely have had sufficient resources to find suitable alternatives. If this
practice were to become widespread, as defendants in these cases and
others become more confident in their use of copyrighted works with-
out the need to pay the appropriate compensation, then artists like
EarlJackson andJorge Antonio Sandoval will suffer the consequences.
Simple compliance with the formalities required for the use of a copy-
righted work is necessary in these types of cases to prevent such an
unjust result.
306. See Sandoval, 973 F. Supp. at 409.
307. See PATRY, supra note 91, at 561.
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